The Battle of Newmarket, Virginia, 
May 15, 1864. 

By Col. H. A. du Pont 




























































The Battle of Newmarket, Virginia, 
May 15, 1864 



By 

Col. H. A. du Pont 


E>7£ 

•XI ^ 3 


Copyright, 1923 
By Henry A. du Pont 
All rights reserved 


AUG 29 1923 


©C1A755853 

'W'S J 


PREFACE 


It would seem that the publication at this time of 
a pamphlet dealing with the battle of Newmarket, Va., 
May 15,1864, is not inappropriate, as the recital sup¬ 
plements much that has been already printed in regard 
to that engagement. 

The main facts of this account were committed to 
writing many years ago but, at the request of my chil¬ 
dren, the narrative has been recently revised and some¬ 
what extended. This will sufficiently explain a number 
of personal references which would be out of place in a 
strictly historical work. 

Winterthur, Delaware, 

May 15, 1923. 


H. A. du Pont. 


Footnote References 


0. R.—The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of 
the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Armies. 

L. 34.—Life with the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts In¬ 

fantry, by Col. Wm. S. Lincoln. 

N.M.C.—The Newmarket Campaign, by Prof. Edward 
Raymond Turner. 

M. S.I.—Journal of the Military Service Institution, 

Nov.-Dee. 1912. 

B.L.—Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 

F.A.J.—Field Artillery Journal, Nov.-Dee. 1922. 

L.W.V.—Loyal West Virginia, by Maj. Theodore F. 
Lang. 


THE BATTLE OF NEWMARKET 


On the 29th of February, 1864, Brig. Gen. B. F. Kel¬ 
ley, U. S. Volunteers, commanding the Department of 
West Virginia, was superseded by Maj. Gen. Franz 
Sigel, U. S. Volunteers, who reached the headquarters 
at Cumberland, Maryland, on the 10th of March and 
at once took charge. General Sigel, then in his thirty- 
ninth year, was a native of Germany and in his youth 
had been a lieutenant in the Baden army which he left 
to embark in unsuccessful revolutionary movements. 
In consequence, he had been forced to abandon his na¬ 
tive land in 1849, and after three years mainly spent in 
Switzerland and England, came to the United States 
in 1852, some nine years before the beginning of 
our Civil War. Entering the service as a colonel, 
he was quickly appointed a brigadier and then a 
major-general of volunteers. After serving in Mis¬ 
souri, he led a force which in 1862 fruitlessly pursued 
Stonewall Jackson in the Valley of Virginia and later 
in the same year became a corps commander under 
Pope where his sluggish movements and constant dis¬ 
regard of instructions brought him into Very great 
discredit with those in high command. 

On the 17th of May, two days after the battle of 
Newmarket, General Halleck wrote as follows to Gen¬ 
eral Grant: “I have sent the substance of your 
despatch to General Sigel. Instead of advancing on 
Staunton he is already in full retreat on Strasburg. 
If you expect anything from him you will be mistaken. 
He will do nothing but run. He never did anything 

s 


else.” 1 Halleck, as it would seem, did not mean to 
impeach Sigel’s personal courage, but referred to his 
incapacity as a commander which had always led to the 
enemy’s getting the advantage and compelling him to 
beat a hasty retreat. 

Notwithstanding Sigel’s most unsatisfactory record, 
Secretary Stanton, no doubt on account of political 
considerations, selected him for the independent and 
highly important command of the Department of West 
Virginia. The disastrous results of this unwise choice 
probably led the Secretary to refer his selection of 
Sigel’s successor to General Grant, who, May 19th, 
promptly telegraphed General Halleck as follows: “By 
all means I would say appoint Hunter, or anybody else, 
to the command of West Virginia.” 2 As might have 
been anticipated, Sigel’s attitude was largely that of 
a foreigner and he was always keenly alive to the in¬ 
terest of his fellow-Germans which he sought to pro¬ 
mote by every means in his power. 

Upon taking charge of the Department of West 
Virginia he issued orders reorganizing the infantry 
and cavalry into brigades and divisions, the 1st In¬ 
fantry Division, to which my battery belonged, con¬ 
sisting of two brigades under the respective com¬ 
mands of Colonels Moor, 28th Ohio, and Thobum, 1st 
W. Va. Volunteers, each brigade being composed of 
four regiments of volunteer infantry. The artillery 
destined for field service was assigned as follows: Du 
Pont’s Light Battery B, 5th U. S. Artillery, Carlin's 
Light Battery D, 1st W. Va. Volunteer Artillery, and 
Snow’s Light Battery B, 1st Md. Volunteer Artillery 

* O. R„ Vol. XXXVI, Part II, p. 840. 

2 O. R., Vol. XXXVI, Part I, p. 492. * 


6 



(each having six 3-inch rifled guns), to the 1st Infantry 
Division under Brig. Gen. J. C. Sullivan, U. S. Volun¬ 
teers, to which also belonged Von Kleiser’s consoli¬ 
dated 30th and 32d N. Y. Volunteer Light Batteries 
(six Napoleon guns), a German organization, while 
Ewing’s Horse Battery G, 1st W. Va. Volunteer Artil¬ 
lery (four 3-inch rifled guns), under Lieutenant Mor¬ 
ton, formed part of the 1st Cavalry Division com¬ 
manded by Maj. Gen. Julius Stahel, U. S. Volunteers, 
another foreigner. Sigel made no provision for a chief 
of artillery nor for any separate organization of that 
arm, thus throwing away the advantages of proper 
selection of position, concentration of fire and general 
“ ensemble” of operations which so greatly enhance 
artillery efficiency. He also appointed General Stahel 
chief of his staif without relieving him from the com¬ 
mand of the 1st Cavalry Division, a step which had 
the practical effect of giving Stahel full control like¬ 
wise of the infantry division under Sullivan, the only 
other general officer with the troops in the field, 
consisting of one infantry and one cavalry division. 

General Grant had decided that Crook was to move 
from the Kanawha and that all available troops in the 
Department of West Virginia were to concentrate at 
Beverly, W. Va., from which point they were to march 
southward under General E. 0. C. Ord and unite with 
Crook, the objective being the Virginia & Tennessee 
Railroad, an important Confederate line of communi¬ 
cation. The movement under Ord was abandoned, 
however, as the roads were impassable, and Sigel was 
directed to take command of these troops and move 
up the Valley to effect a junction with Crook at Staun¬ 
ton or some point in its vicinity. 


7 


Very early in April, Light Battery B, 5th Artillery, 
was sent by rail to Webster, W. Va., and from that 
place moved to Grafton, four miles away, for the pur¬ 
pose of taking part in the Ord expedition, but when this 
was abandoned, the battery, on the 21st, returned to 
Martinsburg. A week later it marched with the rest 
of Sullivan’s division to Bunker Hill, a small village 
on the Valley turnpike about ten miles from Martins¬ 
burg. From that point it moved to Winchester which 
was reached on the 1st of May, whence, after a delay 
of some ten days, it marched at 6:00 A. M. on the 11th 
to Woodstock where our advance guard first came in 
contact with the enemy. 

Although he did not know the country, Colonel Au¬ 
gustus Moor of the 28th Ohio Volunteers, commanding 
the 1st Infantry Brigade and a capable officer, was 
ordered on the 14th to make a reconnoissance in force 
to feel the enemy and ascertain the position and 
strength of the Confederate troops under Imboden, 
who was reported to be at Rude’s Hill on the other 
side of the Shenandoah, a movement which led to the 
battle of Newmarket on the following day. 

As two Ohio regiments of Moor’s brigade were on 
escort duty with the train, he was not strong enough to 
make the reconnoissance with the remainder of his 
command. Such being the case, the usual and ordinary 
procedure would have been to send the other brigade 
under Colonel Thoburn, a very competent man, who 
knew the ground well and later commanded a division 
of Crook’s corps at the battles of Winchester and 
Fisher’s Hill, as well as of Cedar Creek where he was 
killed. This did not, however, accord with the views of 
General Sigel, who insisted that the reconnoissance 


8 


should be commanded by Moor who was a fellow- 
German, and to make up for the latter's deficiency in 
numbers, he took away two of Thoburn’s regiments 
and ordered them to report to Moor. This breaking 
up of brigades gave rise to much confusion at the 
opening of the conflict, and Moor himself stated in his 
report that it was a great mistake not to have let him 
take the regiments of his own brigade. 1 

In discussing this battle, an account will be given 
of the part taken by Light Battery B, 5th U. S. Artil¬ 
lery, from the time it went into action between 2:30 
and 3:00 P. M., until the close of the engagement, but as 
the other details of the conflict have been very accu¬ 
rately described by Turner, 2 Colonna, 3 and others, they 
will not be repeated here further than to say that 
Sigel’s line of battle, in its final position, was about a 
mile north of Newmarket at right angles to the turn¬ 
pike, with his right flank resting on the Shenandoah 
River and his left on Smith’s Creek. His troops, from 
right to left, were disposed as follows: Snow’s and 
Carlin’s batteries on the extreme right and, next to 
them, Thoburn’s infantry brigade with the 34th Mass. 
Volunteers in touch with the batteries, and on its left 
the 1st W. Va. and the 54th Penna. Volunteers in the 
order named, with the 12th W. Va. Volunteers in sec¬ 
ond line and for the support of the two artillery units. 
Next came the two regiments of Moor’s brigade, 123d 
Ohio and 18th Conn. Volunteers, then Von Kleiser’s 
battery with Stahel’s cavalry on its left and extending 

1 L. 34, p. 289. 

2 N. M. C. 

3 M. S. I. 

9 



to the creek, Ewing's horse battery being on the ex¬ 
treme left. 

The battle of Newmarket was fought on Sunday, 
May 15, 1864, and resulted in Sigel’s complete defeat 
with casualties of 650 in killed and wounded and 185 
prisoners, a total of 835. He also lost five pieces of 
artillery, one abandoned by Von Kleiser’s battery after 
an ineffectual effort had been made to carry it off the 
field swung under a limber, while the other four were 
taken by the enemy, as they could not be withdrawn 
after the horses had been shot down. With the excep¬ 
tion of a few infantry units which retained their 
formation as they fell back, as well as of a portion of the 
artillery, the Union forces fled precipitately and in the 
greatest possible disorder until they reached Rude's 
Hill some four miles to the rear, where, after great ex¬ 
ertions, Generals Sigel, Stahel and Sullivan rallied them 
behind the two Ohio regiments which had not taken 
part in the battle. From Rude’s Hill the beaten army 
withdrew to the north bank of the Shenandoah but no 
attempt was made to take position there, though the 
ground was defensible, and the retreat was continued 
for another mile across Mill Creek, a tributary of the 
Shenandoah close to Mount Jackson, where, as Sigel 
stated, “we were perfectly safe, as the creek was high 
and could not be forded.” 1 Notwithstanding this 
assertion he was evidently very nervous, as he ordered a 
further retreat, beginning at 9:00 P. M., and after an 
all-night march his troops reached Edinburg about 7:00 
A. M. on the 16th, from which point they continued 
their retrograde movement after a short halt, arriving 
at Strasburg about 5:00 P. M., and early on the morning 


1 B. L., Vol. IV, p. 490. 


10 



of the 17th took a strong position north of Cedar Creek, 
which was *‘easily defensible against very large 
odds,” 1 my battery of course accompanying the rest of 
the division. 

In his brief official report to the Adjutant-General of 
the Army made the day after the battle, Sigel described 
the flight of his troops as a gradual retirement from 
the battlefield, 2 but in his subsequent account written 
for the “Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,” he 
admitted that “there was some confusion and scatter¬ 
ing of our retreating forces.” All the same, however, 
the complete demoralization of most of his command 
not only came under my personal observation but was 
confirmed by one of his German compatriots, Colonel 
Moor, commanding the 1st Brigade of the Infantry 
Division. The official report of this officer stated that 
two of his regiments which did not take part in the bat¬ 
tle (the 28th and 116th Ohio Volunteers) joined him 
about 4:00 P. M. after being compelled to fix bayonets 
in order to clear their way on the turnpike through the 
“disgraceful fleeing masses of cavalry and straggling 
infantry.” 

As a usual thing, highly conflicting statements have 
been made in regard to the numbers on each side actu¬ 
ally taking part in the various engagements of the 
Civil War, and the battle of Newmarket was no excep¬ 
tion to this rule. Sigel stated in his official report that 
the enemy’s infantry alone was 7000 strong—which, 
with about 1100 or 1200 cavalry and artillery (Turner’s 
figures as given in his “Newmarket Campaign”) 
would make the whole Confederate force about «8150 

1 Letter from Col. du Pont to his father, dated May 17, 1864. 

2 O. R., Vol. XXXVII, Part I, p. 76. 


11 




men. In Sigel’s account, however, as published in 
“Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,” 1 this total is 
reduced to “7000 men or thereabouts,” but, on the 
other hand, Turner puts the strength of the Confeder¬ 
ate troops engaged at 4500 men and those of Sigel at 
6000, 2 the last figure being no doubt based upon the 
actual strength of the Federal regiments as shown by 
the official returns. It is evident, however, that due 
allowance was not made for the large detachments 
required for the protection of the Union signal stations 
and of the very heavy train, which included 200 
wagons of supplies for Crook’s column in addition to 
the necessary transportation for Sigel’s own command. 

We may observe that the situation was radically dif¬ 
ferent with respect to the lines of communication of the 
contending forces. While the Confederates had nothing 
to fear, those of the Union armies were in constant 
danger of attack from Mosby’s partisan troops which 
were ready at all times to sally forth from some secure 
position in the mountains bordering the Valley; and in 
this particular instance, Colonel Mosby has expressly 
stated in his report that he had sent “two detachments 
under Captains Richards and Chapman to embarrass 
Sigel as much as possible.” 

It can be clearly shown by the official reports that 
Turner’s figure of 6000 Federals actually participating 
in the battle is much too high. We have seen that there 
were two brigades of four regiments each in Sullivan’s 
infantry division—a total of eight regiments, two of 
which, as is not disputed, were not in the battle, leaving 
six regiments that actually fought. Inasmuch as three 

1 B. L., Vol. IV, p. 488. 

2 N. M. C., pp. 114 and 111. 

12 



companies of the 18th Conn. Volunteers were detached 
as a guard to the Union signal station, “ somewhat less 
than 350” 1 men of that regiment were in the battle, 
while in the 54th Penna. Volunteers the number of “ of¬ 
ficers and men in the engagement was 566.” 2 In the 
34th Mass. Volunteers, “the detachment of one com¬ 
pany” (as skirmishers) “ with other details left about 
450 muskets in line,” 3 or about 50 men to each of the 
nine remaining companies. Allowing 50 muskets and 
two musicians to the detached company and adding 
the two officers who, are known to have been with it, 
we have a total of 54 which, with 450 muskets reported 
by Colonel Wells, makes 504 men; and increasing this 
figure by the sergeant-major, two color bearers and 18 
company musicians, together with the 25 officers re¬ 
ported by name as having been present, we have a total 
of 550 officers and men. This makes an aggregate of 
1466 men for the three units just mentioned, compris¬ 
ing one-half of the Federal infantry, and it is safe to 
say that the number of those belonging to the three 
remaining units which took part in the conflict was 
not more (and in all likelihood less) than 1698 men, or 
566 for each unit, making a grand total of 3164 in¬ 
fantry. Further, Turner puts the Union cavalry at 
1000 men (which coincides with the number given in 
the “Battles and Leaders of the Civil War”) and the 
Union artillery at 300, and if we accept these figures 
we have an aggregate of only 4464 instead of 6000. 
Turner's estimated strength of the Federal artillery, 
however, is too low, as it can be readily computed 

1 O. R., Vol. XXXVII, Part I, p. 82. 

2 O. R., Vol. XXXVII, Part I, p. 87. 

3 Ibid., p. 85. 


13 




that nearly 350 artillerists presumably took part in the 
fighting, instead of 300, and counting the 50 in excess 
it will be seen that the strength of the opposing forces 
was about equal. In view of the very liberal estimates 
made of the strength of the three Union infantry regi¬ 
ments concerning which we have no details, there 
seems to be a reasonable probability that the number 
of Southern combatants may have slightly exceeded 
those of the North, which, if correct, is all the worse 
for Sigel’s generalship, as it shows the extent of his 
failure to concentrate his whole command which 
exceeded that of Breckinridge by at least 1000 or 
1500 men. 

At 5:00 A. M. on Sunday morning (May 15th), Sul¬ 
livan’s division, of which my battery formed a part, 
began its movement on the turnpike towards Mount 
Jackson (arriving there about 10:00 A. M.), crossed 
the Shenandoah and continued its march southward. 
About 11:00 A. M. we heard some cannonading towards 
the front, to which not much attention was paid, as it 
was generally known that a reconnoissance in force 
was being made. Extraordinary as it may seem, Gen¬ 
eral Sullivan evidently had not been informed of the 
impending battle, as our march was not hastened and 
before noon, when we were not far from Newmarket, 
he ordered a half-hour’s halt to give the men time to 
eat their rations. 

The weather was extremely hot and sultry, with in¬ 
termittent showers, and my battery horses, white with 
lather, seemed so thirsty that, as soon as the halt was 
ordered, I asked and received General Sullivan’s per¬ 
sonal permission to unhitch and send them, in charge 
of an officer, to drink at a little stream, commonly 


14 


known in Virginia as a ‘ ‘branch/’ some four or five 
hundred yards to the west of the turnpike. While 
the horses were drinking, an order came from 
General Sigel to send him two batteries as rapidly as 
possible, upon which Sullivan immediately ordered 
forward Carlin’s and Von Kleiser’s batteries, at 
the same time informing me that the regular battery 
would have been one of those sent had not its horses 
been unhitched. A few minutes later, when the battery 
was in complete readiness, a second order arrived di¬ 
recting Sullivan to move at once with his infantry, 
but to my extreme surprise and disappointment, 
he interpreted this order literally and, as my battery 
was not specifically mentioned, ordered it to remain 
where it was, but said that he would send for it as 
soon as he reached the front, which he failed to do. 
Sigel claims 1 to have sent orders to Sullivan through 
Captains McEntee and Putnam of his staff “to bring 
forward all his troops without delay,” but this state¬ 
ment is obviously not correct. 

Later very heavy firing was heard indicating that the 
engagement was in progress, but still no orders were 
received and I became excessively uneasy fearing that 
my command would not get into action. Finally, after 
a delay which seemed endless, the order came, when 
the battery instantly moved to the front at a sharp 
gallop, arriving on the battlefield between 2:30 and 
3:00 P. M. 

As we drew near the scene of conflict, I directed the 
caissons to draw out of the column and go into park 
at a suitable distance in rear under the command of 

1 B. L., Vol. IV, p. 489. 

15 




Quartermaster-Sergeant Robert Sauthoff. Pushing for¬ 
ward then with my six pieces the whole Federal line 
was found to be retreating in the greatest disorder, 
save a few regiments to the west of the turnpike which 
were keeping up their formation as they fell back. 1 On 
the east side of that highway, the Union forces were 
in total rout and making for the rear in the wildest 
confusion—infantry and cavalry mingled with what 
was left of Von Kleiser’s battery which had become 
completely disorganized after being very badly 
mauled by the fire of ten Confederate 3-inch rifled guns 
under McLaughlin. 

No general officer was in sight, but I was at once 
pounced upon by a number of young and inexperienced 
staff officers who proceeded to give me (upon their own 
initiative but in the names of Generals Sigel or Stahel) 
the most absurd and contradictory orders with respect 
to putting the battery in position. In speaking of the 
youth of most of these officers, it occurs to me that I 
myself was not twenty-six at the time, but common 
sense, reinforced by eight years of continuous military 
instruction and military discipline, made it easy to 
reach an instant decision as to what ought to be done, 
and, although under fire for the first time in my life, 
I then and there made up my mind to ignore the con¬ 
flicting instructions and to take such measures as 
seemed right and proper. In brief, I was compelled to 
act, and did act, upon my own judgment and of course 
assumed all responsibility. This was the last that was 
seen of the staff officers in question, who evidently went 
promptly to the rear with the rest of Sigel’s forces, and 

1 Among them the 54th Penna. and 34th Mass. Volunteer Infantry. 


16 



from that time forward until shortly before 9:00 o’clock 
at night, when the division marched from Woodstock, 
I had to depend entirely upon myself and did not re¬ 
ceive a single order, either directly or indirectly, from 
any military superior! 

The battery was in the open and entirely without 
support, but the curtain of smoke which hung over the 
field prevented the Confederates from discovering this 
fact, and it seemed necessary to risk the loss of some 
of my guns in order to cover and protect the retreat 
of the Union troops. The leading platoon (two guns) 
under Second Lieutenant Charles Holman, was at once 
put in position close to the turnpike and on its right, or 
west side, and instantly opened fire. Taking advantage 
of this, I ordered the other four pieces to the rear, and 
riding back, put the center platoon, under First Ser¬ 
geant S. D. Southworth, in position some 500 or 600 
yards farther to the rear and in immediate proximity 
to the east side of the turnpike, with orders to open fire 
as soon as he was unmasked by Holman. Indicating a 
slight swell of the ground some 500 or 600 yards still 
farther to the rear, I also instructed Second Lieutenant 
B. F. Nash, commanding the left platoon, to go into po¬ 
sition at that point. These dispositions, known in the 
tactics of that day as ‘‘retiring by echelon of platoons,” 
consumed but a very few moments, when I galloped 
back to the front and remained with Lieutenant Hol¬ 
man’s pieces which continued to fire with great 
rapidity and precision until we found ourselves entirely 
alone, with not a single Federal soldier in sight save 
the members of our own battery. Telling Holman that 
we had ‘‘to get out of this” and ordering him to go 
back at a gallop and take the best position he could find 


17 





some 500 or 600 yards behind Nash’s platoon, I joined 
Southworth, a most promising and handsome young 
soldier who five months later (as an officer) fell at the 
battle of Cedar Creek. With the utmost coolness and 
accuracy, he opened on the enemy as soon as Holman’s 
platoon had passed and kept up a rapid fire until his 
own platoon was in its turn left entirely isolated, when 
he received orders similar to those already given to 
Holman. I then joined the left platoon under Nash, who 
opened promptly in his turn and continued to fire until 
he fell back by my direction, when Holman began firing 
for the second time. My recollection is that neither 
Southworth nor Nash opened again, as the enemy had 
apparently discontinued his advance, though we were 
still under Confederate artillery fire. 

In his official report, Colonel Moor has stated that he 
formed some troops on the turnpike to the right and 
left of a battery, which was evidently either Snow’s or 
Carlin’s, as both of these units were in retreat. Light 
Battery B, 5th U. S. Artillery, however, did not come 
in contact with any infantry command and was entirely 
without support throughout the whole battle. 

In order to be in the best possible position for de¬ 
fence, had the Confederates resumed their advance, the 
caissons were directed to precede us on the turnpike 
and the formation of echelon by platoons was main¬ 
tained until we reached about sundown (7:05 P. M.) 
the bridge over the Shenandoah, which we found abso¬ 
lutely deserted. To my extreme surprise no rear guard 
had been left at that point after the! bulk of the Union 
troops had crossed, nor was any officer of General 
Sigel’s staff on hand to take cognizance of the situation 
and report to him in regard to the withdrawal of the 


18 


whole command to the north bank of the Shenandoah. 

In view of the precipitate retreat and demoralization 
of our troops, it seemed wise to take steps to prevent 
the enemy from passing over the river during the night, 
and though there were no orders in regard to the bridge, 
I took the responsibility of partially destroying it, but 
never received subsequently either commendation or 
criticism of the action taken. The pieces, caissons and 
forge passed to the other side, but the battery wagon 
was retained and Quartermaster-Sergeant Sauthoff, 
with the artificers of the battery, assisted by some 
cannoneers, proceeded to take the tools which the 
wagon carried and tear up the bridge floor preparatory 
to setting it on fire. 

While this was going on, a troop of volunteer cavalry 
remained in close column to the east of the bridge, but 
too far away for oral communication, and when a bugler 
was sent to notify the officer in command (name and 
regiment then unknown) that it was necessary to cross 
the river immediately, as we were about to destroy the 
bridge, he complied with an apparent reluctance 
which was hard to understand at the time and passed 
within a few feet of me without uttering a single word. 
The incident had almost passed from my memory, when, 
upon reading, some twenty years later, Sigel’s paper 
on the battle of Newmarket, 1 the name of the officer was 
revealed as well as the probable cause of his dis¬ 
pleasure. He evidently wanted his men to be the last 
Union soldiers to cross the bridge, and though my de¬ 
cision to destroy it unintentionally deprived him of 
that dubious honor, he received it all the same at the 
hands of General Sigel, who has stated in his account 

1 Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, B. L., Vol. IV, p. 487. 


19 



that ‘‘Captain Battersby’s company was the last to 
cross the bridge.” 1 As the planking was removed 
and then set on fire under my immediate supervision, 
it fell to my lot to be the last person to cross; but no 
special credit was involved, as we were not under fire 
and the enemy had wholly discontinued his pursuit. 

The services rendered by Light Battery B, 5th Artil¬ 
lery, in the Newmarket battle are not mentioned in the 
official records: if General Sullivan made any reports, 
there is no trace of their existence, while those made 
by Sigel shortly after the engagement were very brief 
and did not go into details. In the very full account, 
however, entitled ‘‘Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley,” 
which the latter wrote some years subsequently for the 
‘ ‘Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,” his only men¬ 
tion of the artillery unit under my command was as 
follows: ‘‘The Du Pont Battery took position behind 
the right of Thoburn’s brigade as a reserve.” This 
statement is absolutely untrue, as the battery was not 
in that part of the field at all, but at a point on the Val¬ 
ley turnpike about a mile and a half from the battle¬ 
field, where General Sullivan, to the very keen disap¬ 
pointment of its officers and men, had personally 
ordered it to remain until further instructions. Except 
as just stated, Sigel’s narrative does not make any ref¬ 
erence whatever to the battery and he is absolutely 
silent in regard to the part it played in covering the 
retreat of the Union forces—an omission not appar¬ 
ently due to any personal ill will, but the result rather 
of his habitual carelessness and lack of information in 

1 Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, B. L., Vol. IV, p. 490. 


30 



/ 


regard to the details of his command. My recital of the 
conduct of Light Battery B, 5th Artillery, in the New¬ 
market battle is, therefore, not only a contribution to 
the history of the campaign but an act of justice to the 
personnel of the unit in question; and as the account 
is fully confirmed by the statements of others, it would 
seem that Sigel’s omission to further refer to the bat¬ 
tery cannot detract from the weight to be accorded to 
my testimony. 

Although the battle of Newmarket was of compara¬ 
tively little importance, either with respect to the num¬ 
bers engaged or the results attained, it was an episode 
of our Civil War which has always aroused special 
interest in Virginia, largely due to the fact that the 
youthful cadets of the Virginia Military Institute had 
participated so valiantly in that engagement. As time 
went on, various features of the conflict were fre¬ 
quently discussed by those who had fought on the 
Confederate side. Incidentally, the part taken by the 
unit under my command in covering the retreat of the 
Union forces was fully recognized, and ample and 
complete justice was finally accorded to the regular 
battery in an article on the battle of Newmarket which 
appeared some ten years ago in the ‘'Journal of the 
Military Service Institution,” the author having par¬ 
ticipated in the fighting on the Southern side as cadet 
captain of Company D of the Virginia Military Insti¬ 
tute battalion. 1 Later, Turner, in his history of the 
Newmarket campaign, has stated that the battery 
‘‘did excellent service, firing into the enemy and with- 

1 The Battle of Newmarket, by B. A. Colonna, in M. S. I. 


21 



drawing slowly by platoonsj” 1 and lastly, Col. J. C. 
Wise, in a .most appreciative article entitled “Field 
Artillery in Rear Guard Action,” 2 has given a de¬ 
tailed account of the part taken by my battery in 
the battle of Newmarket as an illustration of his sub¬ 
ject. Both of the magazine articles, however, which 
are perhaps too laudatory in their tone, entirely cor¬ 
roborate my narrative, and the first named paper, by 
Benjamin A. Colonna, has exceptional weight as com¬ 
ing from the pen of an eye-witness. 

Although the effectiveness of its fire could not be 
verified on account of the thick smoke which shrouded 
the battlefield, it was always my conviction that the 
battery had done good work, but Colonna’s article re¬ 
vealed the fact that I had “builded better than I 
knew.” His statement is as follows: “The enemy was 
now, say 2:45 P. M., retreating everywhere in great 
disorder, and our pursuit continued until about 3:00 
P. M., when we found ourselves in front of Du Pont’s 
Battery B, 5th Regular Artillery. The audacity of this 
Battery caused us to think that it had a strong infantry 
support and we paused to form line before advancing 
further. This caused a delay of fifteen or twenty min¬ 
utes and allowed the Thirty-fourth Mass., the Twelfth 
W. Va. and the Fifty-fourth Pa., and perhaps some 
other troops, time enough to slip through to free¬ 
dom.” 3 

The events which took place on the Union side dur¬ 
ing the twenty-four hours preceding the battle are of 
special interest, because they not only determined the 

1 N. M. C., p. 93. 

2 F. A. J., p. 502. 

3 M. S. I., pp. 346-347. 

22 



precise location of the conflict but the approximate 
moment when the fighting was to begin. As previously- 
stated, late in the day, on the 14th, Sigel had 
ordered a reconnoissance in force under Colonel Moor 
to procure all the information possible in regard to the 
strength and disposition of the enemy’s forces. General 
Imboden, the Confederate commander, fell back upon 
Moor’s advance, whereupon the latter crossed the 
Shenandoah and pushed on as far as Newmarket, 
twenty miles south of Woodstock, which he held at 
dark, having learned positively that Breckinridge with 
his reenforcements had joined Imboden—which infor¬ 
mation was in the possession of the Federal commander 
late that night, as he himself admitted. 1 

Having ascertained what he wanted to know, Sigel 
should have promptly ordered Moor to fall back on 
Mount Jackson (seven miles distant) where all the 
Union troops could have been more readily concen¬ 
trated; but instead of doing this, he left the compara¬ 
tively small force under Moor to face the entire Con¬ 
federate army until he could personally reconnoiter the 
terrain and decide whether he should “meet the 
enemy’s attack” 2 near Newmarket or at Mount 
Jackson. 

Sigel, as it would seem, did not reach the front until 
about 10:00 A. M. on the morning of the battle, and 
“with his staff and bodyguard came on the ground 
with a flourish,” as related by Major T. F. Lang, of the 


1 B. L., Vol. IV, p. 488. 

2 B. L., Vol. IV, p. 488. 

23 



6th W. Va. Cavalry (temporarily on Sigel’s staff). 1 Had 
not two or three hours’ delay been gained by the skilful 
maneuvering of the Union troops in the early morning, 
which led the enemy to believe that the whole Federal 
army had arrived, Moor’s comparatively small force 
would have been driven back and probably very 
roughly handled by the advance of Breckinridge’s 
entire command. As matters turned out, the Confed¬ 
erate delay was to their advantage, for otherwise Sigel 
would have been unable to make a stand south of 
Mount Jackson and his troops, of necessity, would have 
been more concentrated. 

Having succeeded, however, in making his exam- 
ination of the ground, Sigel decided to risk a battle 
near Newmarket and the prime factors which prompted 
this resolution, according to his own statement, were 
the strategic importance of that place and the dis¬ 
couragement which would be caused by the withdrawal 
of the troops under Moor who had reported that his 
position was very good. 2 As a further reason, Sigel 
claimed that Lang had asserted that the troops were 
“eager for the fight,” 3 although the last named makes 
no mention of it in his book. 

To any professional soldier, the grounds upon which 
Sigel based his decision to fight at Newmarket, would 
seem entirely inadequate, and it goes without saying 
that instead of devoting so much time and thought to 
reconnoitering the terrain and considering the strate¬ 
gical aspects of the case, he should have given his 
close attention to the concentration of his troops and 

1 L. W. V., p. 114. 

2 B. L., Vol. IV, p. 488. 

3 Ibid. 

24 



to seeing that they were in proper condition upon 
going into action and not physically exhausted and 
suffering from hunger, as was the case with some of 
the Union infantry regiments in the Newmarket battle. 1 

The causes of Sigel’s defeat are not difficult to de¬ 
termine. It is a fundamental precept of the military 
art, as Jomini has long since pointed out, that a good 
commander * ‘maneuvers in such a way as to engage 
the mass of his own force with fractions of the hostile 
army.” Breckinridge acted on this principle while 
Sigel seems to have had no conception of its exist¬ 
ence. At 5:00 A. M. on the morning of the battle, 
Breckinridge’s troops were well in hand and massed 
a little south of Newmarket, while at the very same 
hour, Sullivan’s division, comprising the main body 
of the Union infantry with eighteen pieces of artillery, 
was just beginning its march from Woodstock, twenty 
miles away, leaving behind (on train escort duty) two 
regiments, constituting one-half of its 1st brigade. 
These units were not relieved and ordered to the front 
until 8:00 A. M., 2 too late to take part in the fight, 
which did not prevent Sigel, however, from stating 
that he had “no doubt that the battle would have 
ended differently if the two regiments, which I had 
good reason to believe were near , had arrived in time 
to assist us.” 3 

In addition to the confusion heretofore mentioned 
incident to the temporary breaking up of the infantry 
brigades when the reconnoissance in force was ordered, 

1 O. R., Vol. XXXVII, Part I, p. 81. 

2 o. R., Vol. XXXVII, Part I, p. 80. 

3 B. L., Vol. IV, p. 490. 


25 





Sigel made a further and much more serious error in 
regard to the disposition of his artillery, a matter 
which has not been very thoroughly discussed in the 
various accounts of the battle. 

As before stated, the Federal artillery consisted of 
Du Pont’s, Carlin's and Snow’s batteries, each having 
six 3-inch rifled pieces—of Von Kleiser’s battery of 
six Napoleon guns, and lastly, of Ewing’s Horse bat¬ 
tery (four 3-inch rifled guns) commanded by Lieuten¬ 
ant Morton and posted on the extreme left of the 
Federal line with the cavalry under Stahel. 

The key of the Federal position was the high ground 
on its right where Snow’s 3-inch rifled battery was 
very properly placed, and the reports show that Car¬ 
lin’s and Von Kleiser’s batteries, as they reached the 
field, were assigned to their positions by General 
Sigel in person. He made, however, the very grave 
blunder of placing Carlin, with rifled guns like Snow’s, 
immediately on the last named’s left, and Von Kleiser, 
with the six Napoleon guns of his German battery, in 
apparently the more prominent and important position 
on a slight elevation near the turnpike in the center 
of the line, entirely overlooking the fact, however, that 
the German battery, on account of the shorter range 
of its pieces, could not effectively return the fire of the 
Confederate 3-inch rifled guns. Had Von Kleiser been 
placed next to Snow on the Union right, when the 
Confederates assaulted that flank the canister fire 
from his Napoleon guns, by reason of their larger 
calibre, would have been much more effective than that 
from Carlin’s rifled pieces; and if Du Pont’s and Car¬ 
lin’s batteries had been in the position occupied by 
Von Kleiser, they could have easily held their own 


26 


against McLaughlin's ten guns, and the result would 
in all probability have been very different, so far as the 
artillery was concerned, and might perhaps have 
turned the scale in favor of the Federal forces. 

In “The Positions and Movements of the Troops in 
the Battle of Newmarket," by Col. G. H. Smith, the 
author states 1 that portions of Carlin's battery took 
part in the reconnoissance in force under Moor, which 
is a mistake. Carlin's entire battery, to my personal 
knowledge, marched with the division from Wood- 
stock at 5:00 A. M. on the 15th and only entered the 
battle when sent forward by General Sullivan as pre¬ 
viously related. 

Although on the turnpike and about fifteen minutes 
from the battlefield, Du Pont's Regular Battery was 
prevented by positive orders from taking part in the 
fight until after 2:30 P. M., when the Union forces 
were just giving way. The six guns of this battery 
comprised more than one-fifth of the Union artillery, 
but Sigel, as he personally put the batteries in posi¬ 
tion, does not appear to have noticed its absence, 
although he ought to have known the number of guns 
under his command. 

In default of a chief of artillery, the mounted bat¬ 
teries all seem to have rendered good service and to 
have accomplished as much as could have been pos¬ 
sibly expected where complete unity of effort was not 
attainable, and the Confederate reports stated that the 
individual action of these batteries was highly efficient. 
It is to be noted that the Horse Battery was not able 
to take a prominent part in the battle, as when Stahel's 
cavalry was disastrously routed after an abortive 


1 pp. 21 and 22. 


27 



charge, the battery was forced to fall back also, and 
Colonna tells us that it accompanied Stahel who moved 
along the westerly bank of Smith’s Creek with a small 
cavalry force watching Imboden’s movements on the 
other side of that stream. 1 

The Confederate artillery consisted of eighteen 
pieces, four of which belonged to Imboden’s cavalry 
and cut but very little figure in the engagement; but 
ten of the remaining pieces, under the immediate com¬ 
mand of Major McLaughlin, chief of artillery, all being 
3-inch rifled guns which outclassed Von Kleiser’s 
shorter range Napoleons, were concentrated upon his 
battery and did great execution, dismounting one of 
his pieces and inflicting many casualties. 

In addition to Sigel’s many shortcomings, both in 
strategy and grand tactics, the military administra¬ 
tion of his command was very far from working 
smoothly and efficiently. His spectacular appearances 
on horseback surrounded by a brilliant but largely in¬ 
competent staff and followed by a cavalry escort, did 
not succeed, as he had apparently hoped would be the 
case, in inspiring the confidence and good will of those 
under his command. The general feeling at the time 
seems to have been largely reflected in the following 
brief extract from a personal letter written by a Union 
officer two days after the battle: “I had anticipated 
something of the kind all along” (Sigel’s defeat) 4 ‘as 
everything has been very badly mismanaged, in my 

1 The Battle of Newmarket, by B. A. Colonna, in M. S. I., p. 348. 


28 



opinion,” 1 a sentiment which Lang has thus fully con¬ 
firmed: “The writer has never forgotten the absolute 
mismanagement of the splendid body of veteran sol¬ 
diers that composed Sigel’s army.” 2 
So manifest was the incompetence displayed by Sigel 
during his brief direction of military affairs in the 
Valley of Virginia that the Secretary of War appar¬ 
ently felt obliged to relieve him. On the 19th of May, 
four days after the battle of Newmarket, Maj. Gen. 
David Hunter, U. S. Volunteers, was assigned to the 
command of the Department of West Virginia, and he 
arrived at Strasburg on the 21st and took over the 
command, his predecessor, at the request of the Wash¬ 
ington authorities, 3 remaining in the department under 
his orders—no doubt a tribute to Sigel’s popularity 
among his fellow-Germans throughout the United 
States. 


1 Letter of May 17, 1864, from Col. du Pont to his father. 

2 Personal Recollections of the Battle of Newmarket, by Maj. 
T. F. Lang. 

3 O. R., Vol. XXXVII, Part II, p. 340. 


29 






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